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ABSTRACT 
We analyse the potential costs and benefits of the EMU to assess the economic issues 
facing Asian countries considering deep monetary cooperation.  The EMU is facing an 
Eastward expansion into Central and Eastern Europe; a more disparate group of countries 
that the original EMU of 12. East Asia, similarly, includes countries with great 
differences in income level and economic structure. There is a question to what extent 
lessons from the current EMU extends to a group of countries with very different 
economic structures as well as political systems.  
We pay particular attention to two kinds of economic benefits and costs of the EU 
that do not appear much in conventional economic analysis. First there are benefits and 
costs of harmonization in different areas including the monetary area. Second, for many 
countries membership in the EU can provide a kind of insurance against domestic 
institutional, legal and political weaknesses. Although we emphasize economic 
arguments it is necessary to recognize that the EU is very much a politically motivated 
project. Politics, however, may well be the biggest obstacle to an EU like system in Asia.  
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“Great Monetary Union—Pity about the economy” 
Martin Wolf in Comments on Wyplosz (2006) 
 
Introduction 
 
Debate about regional integration in Asia has been inspired by the events in the 
EU; in particular, the formation of the EMU in 1999 can be seen as a success in itself and 
shown that fixing exchange rates irrevocably is a policy option. Since the aversion to 
flexible exchange rates is widespread among Asian policymakers, the question arises 
whether a policy initiative like the EMU can be implemented in East Asia as well.  
The pressures on Asian countries with respect to currency policies have often 
been spotty and even contradictory. The current constellation of pegged rates (e.g. China, 
Singapore and Hong Kong pegged to the dollar, primarily, and South Korea pegged to a 
basket of currencies) does not appear to have permanency and stability. China is being 
pressured to float its currency while other countries simultaneously are encouraged to 
narrow the bands of their pegs. China has begun to change the peg policy having realized 
that the current structure is simply not sustainable. 
The lessons from the last decade suggest that Asian financial markets are crisis 
prone and that pegged exchange rates in the region are fragile indeed. The increasing 
economic interdependence generated largely through trade and capital flows has 
sharpened the interest in a regional approach to currency issues.  One alternative is a full-
fledged monetary union like the EMU but an alternative arrangement for irrevocable 
fixing is dollarization. Softer forms of monetary cooperation are of course also available.. 
In this paper we analyse the potential costs and benefits of the EMU to assess the 
economic issues facing Asian countries considering deep monetary cooperation in East 
Asia in particular. The EMU is facing an Eastward expansion into Central and Eastern 
Europe; a more disparate group of countries that the original EMU of 12. East Asia, 
similarly, includes countries with great differences in income level and economic 
structure. There is a question to what extent lessons from the current EMU extends to a 
group of countries with very different economic structures as well as political systems.  
We pay particular attention to two kinds of economic benefits and costs of the EU 
that do not appear much in conventional economic analysis. First there are benefits and 
costs of harmonization in different areas including the monetary area. Second, for many 
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countries membership in the EU can provide a kind of insurance against domestic 
institutional, legal and political weaknesses. Although we emphasize economic 
arguments it is necessary to recognize that the EU is very much a politically motivated 
project. Politics, however, may well be the biggest obstacle to an EU like system in Asia. 
The benefits and costs discussed here have a strong political component in that they 
include institutional aspects of being a member vs. remaining a non-member.  
Asia is well advised to consider the various mechanisms for political coordination 
and integration. Structures like the EU and the EMU are but one option. They may have 
worked well for those who joined and may well be very attractive for those in line, but 
they need not necessarily be copied by Asia.  However, Asia needs to learn from their 
experiences, which we deal with here. The benefits and the costs of an EU and EMU 
systems may well be different depending on the size of the country. We distinguish 
between the EU and EMU decisions because participation in the EMU need not follow 
from EU membership. There is substantial confusion in the literature about effects of the 
EMU per se vs. the effects of EU membership more generally.  
Many long term economic costs and benefits of EMU-membership are nearly 
impossible to quantify since we do not know how the EU and its institutions will develop 
beyond the time horizon of a few years. This uncertainty is compounded by the accession 
of 12 countries with very different economic structures and institutions. We are not 
attempting a quantitative evaluation here but focus on identifying costs and benefits that 
may accrue over different time horizons. An important consideration is that EMU is only 
one aspect of an integration process that has been going on for decades and encompasses 
a wide array of political, public and legal institutions.  
An evaluation of costs and benefits of monetary integration requires also a 
reference point identifying what will happen if there is no currency union. The question 
we ask is whether the benefits of EMU membership can be obtained by means of 
alternative arrangements at lesser or higher costs. The corresponding question applies to 
Asian economies considering joining a currency union. It could be that the interests of 
some countries will be best served by keeping an independent economic system that 
allows domestic institutions to develop to enhance economic growth and welfare based 
on lasting comparative advantages, and by the pursuit of independent fiscal and monetary 
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policies. In other countries the political situation may prevent growth oriented 
institutional reforms as a result of interest group pressures. In these cases, participation in 
regional integration initiatives can be the factor that makes some reform possible 
although the proposed institutional structure need not be the most suitable for each 
specific country. Thus the economic effects of regional integration efforts depend on a 
combination of political and economic factors in each specific country, and they may be 
hard to always sort out accurately. 
The recent rejection of Lithuanian participation in the EMU indicates that the 
decision to join the monetary union is not up to the individual country alone.1 Similar 
concerns can arise in Asia. A county’s choosing to join integration efforts need not 
qualify by criteria of potential partners. Conflicts of interest can arise, since an important 
consideration for some countries is to join integration efforts in order to obtain an 
“insurance” against domestic political or institutional weaknesses while other countries 
need not be willing to offer this type of insurance.  
The rest of this paper discusses strengths and weaknesses of the EMU before 
applying the lessons to Asia. The paper is divided into 5 sections. Section 1 provides an 
overview of the different aspects of harmonization and insurance in Europe, as well as of 
political and economic forces shaping integration in economic and political dimensions. 
The broad categories of costs and benefits and alternative arrangements are specified in 
this section. Macroeconomic adjustment issues arising as a result of monetary policy 
harmonization in the EMU is the topic of Section 2, while microeconomic consequences 
of payment system harmonization in the EMU are discussed in Section 3. The costs and 
benefits identified in the previous sections are discussed from an Asian perspective in 
Section 4. Finally, we summarize in Section 5 the implications for an Asian monetary 
union and currency arrangements in Asia.  
1. Dimensions of Harmonization and Insurance in the EU 
One of the cornerstones for the integration of Europe was the Maastricht Treaty 
established in 1991. The treaty provides for “… a single currency (the euro); provides the 
EU with more power to deal with such matters as the environment, education, public 
                                                 
1 Lithuania’s inflation rate at 2.63 percent in 2005 was marginally higher than the average inflation rate of 
the  three best inflation performers in the EU. The average for these countries was 2.60 including non-
EMU, floating rate Sweden.  
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health, and communications among members; establish a common foreign and defence 
policy; and create greater cooperation between the 12 police and justice systems”.  
 The introduction of a single currency has been viewed as the capstone for the 
Internal Market project. From an economic point of view, the Internal Market project is 
the key factor in an analysis of economic costs and benefits of the EU. This project is 
intended to create an economically integrated region by means of the “four mobilities”; 
mobility of goods, labor, capital and services. Mobility in these respects is then expected 
to inevitably lead to “ever increasing integration”. The four mobilities are by no means 
perfect, however. The recent referendum on a proposed EU constitution in France, in 
particular, and the disagreements within the EU with respect to a mobility enhancing 
Services Directive, indicate that there is strong resistance to economic integration in 
several areas.  
While the internal market project initially was focused on explicit barriers to 
mobility within the EU, it was soon discovered that differences in rules and law for 
economic activities hinder the integration process. For this reason the call for 
harmonization of regulation, laws and other institutions in a number of areas has been 
increasing on the grounds that differences create barriers to mobility. The formation of 
the EMU can be seen as harmonization of monetary policy making institutions and the 
means of payment. 
The EU has the power to harmonize rules in many economic areas by means of 
Directives agreed upon in the Council of Ministers. Individual countries are obliged to 
introduce the Directives in their own legislation. Some areas remain outside the scope of 
EU legislation, however. Fiscal powers remain on the national level as do education 
systems, health care systems and social legislation more generally. These systems can 
nevertheless be affected by the EU in important ways, since mobility of, for example, 
labor, constrains the ability of the individual country to tax.  
 Political and other non-economic aspects of the EU cannot be neglected. The 
Copenhagen criteria for EU membership refer to democratic institutions, the rule of law, 
and human rights. These must be met by each country before joining the EU. The 
Maastricht Treaty includes calls for integration in areas of defence and security. Political 
considerations determine how far integration can go in these areas. But even if formal 
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integration does not go far with respect to security and defence issues, there are important 
political consequences of membership in the EU. Benefits or costs of a political nature 
may well overshadow the economic ones, especially for Central and Eastern European 
countries. An EU-membership may well provide the ultimate insurance policy against 
reversion to communism or Russian domination to a higher degree than NATO 
membership alone. If there is an economic price to EU membership, it could be easily 
overshadowed by political considerations. For example, the ‘Keep the Bear at Bay” 
strategy is clearly dominant in Eastern Europe considering its history between 1945 and 
1989.  
Another type of political insurance of EU membership refers to political and legal 
institutions. Several new members do not have strong democratic traditions and their 
legal institutions are weak. EU membership enhances the credibility of democratic 
political institutions and the legal framework of the EU provides some access to the 
European court system in cases where fundamental rights of individuals and firms are 
violated. The political importance of this type of insurance varies across states. This 
variation can be illustrated by the differences in attitudes to sovereignty of political and 
legal institutions across the EU. 
Citizens’ trust in domestic political institutions, government authorities, and legal 
institutions varies greatly within the EU and this variation has increased with the 
Eastward expansion. For example, corruption perceptions vary greatly across both old 
and new EU members and these perceptions could be important for the willingness to 
abdicate sovereignty in a number of areas. The votes in recent referenda in EU member 
states provide some guidance with respect to citizens’ perceptions and attitudes towards 
the EU. Denmark in 2002 and Sweden in 2003 voted ‘NO‘ very strongly to participation 
in the monetary union. The UK would likely vote NO if a referendum were held today. 
These countries are characterized by a relatively high degree of trust in domestic 
institutions and faith in the political forces shaping them. The rejection of the EU's 
constitutional proposal places the Netherlands in the same category. 
 The ten East European countries that joined in May 2004 all voted YES rather 
enthusiastically. These countries became democratic recently, corruption is still 
widespread, and legal institutions are weak. Clearly, these countries perceive the EU as a 
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tool for rapid strengthening of institutions. Among the older 15 EU countries, those 
bordering on the Mediterranean probably belong to the same group. France, however, 
may have to be placed in a separate category. Her citizens seem to have rejected the 
constitutional proposal primarily based on the fear of freedom of mobility. For example, 
in the area of services there is fear that the freedoms would lead to excessive "Anglo-
Saxonization” of the EU and its institutions.   
Table 1 lists three political benefit-cost categories of EU integration. The first 
category is security and defence; the second is sovereignty, and the third is institutional 
harmonization. It is hard to see any security considerations entering the issue of monetary 
integration but the EMU raises issues of both sovereignty and institutional harmonization. 
Abandoning a national currency can be viewed as a cost from a political point of view 
albeit an emotional one. Political costs and benefits of institutional harmonization in the 
monetary area refer to the political legitimacy of the monetary authority and the monetary 
policy pursued. The German Bundesbank had strong legitimacy before the EMU was 
formed while the Italian central bank had very weak legitimacy. Thus, joining the EMU 
was associated with political costs in Germany but with political benefits in Italy 
With this background we turn to a discussion of economic costs and benefits of 
the monetary harmonization implied by participation in the EMU. In the next section we 
discuss monetary policy harmonization and consequences for macroeconomic adjustment 
in the EMU (summarized in Table 2.). Thereafter we turn to payment system 
harmonization and consequences on the micreconomic level of the EMU (summarized in 
Table 3). Other important aspects of harminization in the EU, in particular, 
harmonization of trade barriers, regulation and legislation within the Internal Market, are 
discussed only to the extent there is a link to monetary integration.  
 The alternative monetary arrangements we consider from the point of view of a 
prospective EMU member are a very hard peg within, for example, a Currency Board, 
and floating exchange rates.  
2. Monetary policy harmonization in the EMU; The macroeconomic perspective 
 
Participation in the EMU implies harmonization of monetary policy through the 
harmonization of monetary policy making institutions. The first attempt at a European 
Monetary Union was based on The Werner Report of 1970. As Wyplosz (2006) states, 
 8 
the arguments for a monetary union in this report were primarily political. Close 
economic integration was viewed as a prerequisite for political integration, and a 
common currency was viewed as a necessary condition for economic integration. The 
Delors report, One Union, One Money, published by the European Commission in 1988, 
built on the Werner report, elaborated on the economic arguments in favor of a monetary 
union. The basic argument was that free capital flows make any exchange rate regime 
along the spectrum between irrevocably fixed rates in a monetary union and freely 
floating rates, unstable. If countries retain their rights to change pegged rates, speculative 
capital flows could threaten exchange rate stability. Credibility of fixed rates could be 
obtained only in a monetary union. Floating exchange rates were viewed as unacceptable 
if the objectives with respect to economic integration were to be achieved. 
Wyplosz (2006) points out that the disadvantages of a monetary union were 
passed over rather lightly in the Delors report although the risk associated with 
asymmetric shocks were mentioned. He argues that the omission of important elements 
of Optimum Currency Area (OCA) theory in the Commission’s argumentation for a 
common currency “is the Monetary Union’s original sin.” The OCA theory spells out 
criteria for a country’s choice of exchange rate regime. This theory was well-developed 
and rich already in the late 70’s with a number of criteria for exchange rate regime choice 
although it was not formalized into an easily applicable set of rules balancing the 
different criteria (see e.g. Tower and Willett. 1976). 
 The OCA literature beginning with Mundell (1961) has grown over time to 
incorporate a large number of criteria, including political economy arguments, for a fixed 
exchange rate versus a flexible rate.  In this literature a flexible regime need not be a 
“clean float” but it includes various degrees of adjustability of the exchange rate to short 
run market conditions. In other words, a fixed rate is interpreted as a regime wherein 
exchange rate adjustment is not used as an adjustment mechanism. (See, for example, 
Tower and Willett, 1976, and Wihlborg and Willett, 1991).  The OCA literature has in 
common that the optimum currency area is determined as a trade-off between benefits of 
exchange rate flexibility in terms of macroeconomic adjustment, and microeconomic 
benefits of a common currency under a permanently fixed exchange rate. In Table 2 
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Output Variability and Adjustment and Policy Instruments are the main benefit/cost 
categories commonly discussed in traditional OCA analysis.   
  In response to increasing inflation rates during the 70s monetary theory and OCA 
analyses increased their emphasis on the linkage between the exchange rate regime and 
inflation (Inflation in Table 2). Simultaneously, the theory of monetary policy began to 
incorporate the game theoretic concepts of time-inconsistency and credibility (e.g. 
Kydland and Prescott, 1977, and Barro and Gordon, 1983).  The main point in this 
literature is that abandoning attempts to always achieve “first-best” using discretionary 
policies can be welfare increasing, because attempts to reduce unemployment require 
ever increasing inflation once the discretionary policy measures become anticipated. 
Sticking to a rule for monetary policy in spite of short term costs leads to credibility of 
the rule over time, and a welfare gain relative to the ineffective use of discretionary 
policy in response to short term fluctuations in the economy. 
           The EMU, establishing irrevocably fixed exchange rates internally, and a 
supra-national monetary policy-making authority, is a way for member countries to 
obtain credibility provided the union’s central bank conducts a low-inflation policy with 
credibility2. It is far from likely, however, that the EMU is indeed an OCA in terms of 
labor market flexibility and that the EMU leaders necessarily know which countries 
should be included in order to achieve that optimum area. Joining the EMU could 
therefore be costly in terms of macroeconomic adjustment. 
 Several economists have pointed out that the costs of the EMU in terms of 
macroeconomic adjustment are mitigated and even eliminated to the extent OCA criteria 
for fixed exchange rates are endogenous. Such endogeneity could take the form of 
increased labor mobility and increased real wage flexibility as a result of the nearly 
complete credibility of fixed exchange rates within the EMU.  
 Evidence on endogenous institutional development enhancing wage flexibility 
and mobility in labor markets in particular is reviewed and discussed in De Grauwe and 
Mongelli (2005). Their “cautiously optimistic” assessment of endogenous OCA criteria is 
probably the most positive one within an expanding empirical literature on labor market 
adjustment in the EMU. An OECD Policy Brief on the Euro Area (July 2004) states that 
                                                 
2 See de Grauwe (1996) 
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“Notwithstanding some progress made since the mid 1990s….Labour markets are in 
urgent need for reform.” Most economists (e.g. Blanchard and Giavazzi, 2003, and 
Eichengreen (2002)) studying the subject agree that wages tend to be rigid in most of the 
“old EU”, and that both cross-border and intra country labor mobility is seriously absent. 
Duval and Elmeskov (2005) warn that the EMU may actually weaken the incentives for 
structural reforms in the larger member countries.  
The recent strikes and riots in France in response to a proposed relaxation of 
constraints on laying off young people offer a reminder that it is politically very hard in 
many countries to change labor market institutions that benefit established groups. If 
there is cross-border labor mobility in the EU, it is confined to the relatively well-
educated professional groups. Ironically, governments generally seem to consider these 
groups particularly valued citizens and discourage “brain drain” by means of tax policy in 
particular.  
The most recent members in Eastern and Central Europe with less advanced 
social insurance system may have more mobile labor forces but these labor forces have 
found newly erected barriers in 12 of the 15 older members. There is a widespread fear in 
the latter countries that a wave of “cheap” labor will move in from the new members. 
These attitudes of practical politics stand in contrast to the stated objectives of expanding 
the EMU to include new members.  
 The verdict on endogenous flexibility in the long run is still out as noted in 
Willett, Permpoon and Wihlborg (2006). They conclude that the ambivalent political 
attitude towards labor mobility in many countries and the evidence so far indicate that the 
traditional OCA criteria must be taken seriously for the foreseeable future.  
Alternatives to joining the EMU  
Even if an argument can be made in favor of the EMU as a well-functioning currency 
area if endogenous institutional development is taken into account, there are alternative 
arrangements available with possibly more favorable benefit-cost ratios. 
  The Currency Board (CB) is one realistic alternative arrangement for the 
relatively small economies in Eastern and Central Europe and there are experiences to 
build on if new CBs are to be developed. The CB is similar to a gold standard with 
convertible currencies serving as the anchor instead of gold. The currency in circulation, 
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and reserves held by banks against time and demand deposits are backed by foreign 
currency reserves.  The exchange rate is fixed to a specific currency and anchored in 
legislation making realignments difficult and politically costly. The fixity of exchange 
rates is presumed to be the foundation of stable prices and credibility in the market place. 
In most CBs, there is unlimited convertibility of the local currency. In Estonia, full 
convertibility between the Estonian Kroon and the reference currency has been in effect 
in Estonia since 1992. The money supply grows and shrinks with foreign exchange 
reserves in an open economy with no restrictions on trade, capital flows and FDI. 
 Although the CB implies a less irrevocably fixed exchange rate than a currency 
union it is possible to make the exchange rate fixity highly credible by means of 
appropriate legislation. Examples of credibility enhancing legislative measures in Estonia 
are shown in the Appendix. The credibility of a CB depends on the strength of the 
institutions preventing the CB managers from trying to influence the monetary base, and 
to change the exchange rate.3  
 The costs of a CB relative to the EMU in terms of lesser credibility need not be 
substantial and must be balanced against the potential benefits of being able to abandon 
the CB in an economic crisis requiring substantial factor-cost adjustment relative to 
trading partners. The value of this benefit could be particularly large in Eastern and 
Central Europe where the structures of the economies differ substantially from the mature 
economies of the older members. These differences increase the likelihood of substantial 
asymmetric shocks requiring adjustment of relative cost structures. 
        An alternative route to credibility of monetary policy for the individual country is 
 to strengthen the political independence of the central bank by constitutional and other 
legislative means while allowing the exchange rate to float. There is a large literature 
documenting that independent central banks with a price stability objective are able to 
achieve substantial credibility and relatively low inflation without having to suffer less 
growth or higher unemployment over time (see De Grauwe, 1997). The institutional 
requirement for independence may be stronger than those required for a CB arrangement 
but not beyond the politically feasible in countries where laws are enforceable.  
                                                 
3 See, for example, Sweeney (1998) for a discussion of determinants of a currency board’s credibility 
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All members of the EMU must also establish central bank independence 
constitutionally. The difference between the country inside and outside the EMU is that 
membership in the EMU removes monetary policy making further from domestic 
political forces (Burdekin, Wihlborg and Willett, 1992). This may enhance the credibility 
of the ECB. On the other hand, the incentives of national governments to run fiscal 
deficits as members of the EMU in combination with a weak “Stability Pact” can damage 
the credibility of the ECB. Here is a case when insurance provided by the EU can damage 
the credibility of the ECB. Specifically, if the EU provides implicit insurance of the 
national debt of individual members, the incentives of member states to run deficits 
increase. 
There are a number of countries for which the central bank’s stated political 
independence is not sufficient for credibility of an anti-inflation policy to be achieved 
outside a monetary union. Like a credible CB, de facto independence requires 
institutional and social support.  The former may be, for example, contractual incentives 
for central bank board members to pursue a low inflation policy, and contractual 
safeguards about their positions after leaving the central bank board.  Social support may 
take the form of approval within the social elite of independent conduct while a board 
member. Some transition economies and many developing countries lack both the 
institutional support and the social traditions that could ensure de facto independence 
even if the central bank is made formally independent of political authorities.  Thus, 
formal central bank independence under exchange rate flexibility is not sufficient to gain 
credibility in these countries.  Even a strongly pegged exchange rate may be insufficient 
as long as the central bank has the authority to conduct discretionary monetary policy.  
  It is clear from the above discussion—summarized in Table 2--that there are 
alternative paths to achieving credibility, and that there are costs of retaining credibility 
inside or outside the EMU. Market participants are always suspicious and in need of a 
confirmation. It is performance and its consistency that garners credibility. That 
performance is not necessarily a function of the size of the country, nor its affiliation with 
the EU (EU members have often behaved erratically and outside the confines of the EU). 
A case in point is Estonia: a country that has achieved international economic credibility 
well before its admission to the EU. Other countries may be more susceptible to short 
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term political pressures even if formal monetary policy independence has been 
established. Membership in the EMU could then be seen as an insurance (see Table 2) 
against the failure of domestic institutions.  
The mutuality of dependence within the EMU can support credibility if its 
institutional strength is derived from the relatively disciplined countries with strong 
institutions but serious problems can arise if the less disciplined countries set the policy 
tone. The seemingly harsh treatment of Lithuania’s application to join the EMU can be 
due to the fear among the original EMU participants that their monetary policy 
preferences would receive less weight if all the new members would be allowed in as 
soon as they satisfy the convergence criteria. Thus, there is an unwillingness of providing 
“credibility insurance” for the new EU members through monetary harmonization.  
Summarizing the arguments with respect to a possible trade off between benefits 
of insurance and net costs of monetary harmonization, the benefits of insurance are 
particularly relevant for countries with weak institutional support behind a formally 
independent central bank. The costs of harmonization arise for countries with relatively 
little ability to adjust to macroeconomic shocks under a fixed exchange rate, while there 
are benefits in the form of enhanced credibility of a monetary policy rule. In Section 5 we 
return to these issues in the Asian context. 
 
3. Payment system harmonization in the EMU. The microeconomic perspective            
As mentioned, the traditional OCA literature states that macroeconomic costs of fixed 
exchange rates should be traded off against microeconomic benefits. Table 3 lists three 
categories of potential benefits; reduced costs of currency exchange, reduced exchange 
rate risk in international trade, and improved information contents of prices in 
international trade. The Delors report put substantial emphasis on these factors as sources 
of benefits of a common currency. Clearly, the exchange risk- and information content 
components of these potential benefits would be very similar under a credible hard peg 
and a monetary union. The currency exchange cost would remain, however. Estimates of 
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these costs from before the formation of the EMU varied between 0.1 and 0.5 percent of 
GDP.4  
 The exchange risk component is often emphasized in the discussion of exchange 
rate regimes but most likely highly exaggerated. One reason is that derivatives markets 
allow hedging of short term exchange rate risk. A second and perhaps more important 
reason is that reducing exchange rate risk within the EU does not necessarily imply that 
the total risk facing a firm is reduced. Over longer time horizons exchange rate 
movements are related to macroeconomic shocks that exist under any regime. If so, there 
will be adjustment of other macroeconomic variables instead of the exchange rate.  
 Even if we accept the premise that there is short term exchange rate volatility 
unrelated to macroeconomic determinants of exchange rates in a floating system, 
exchange rate stability as a policy objective is often misguided.  Consider total variability 
(VT) to be the sum of two components, anticipated variability (VA) and unanticipated 
variability VU):  
(1) VT=VA+VU. 
VA is easily and regularly incorporated in interest rate differentials and forward exchange 
rates in money and exchange markets. VU on the other hand can be hedged using options-
, forward- or futures contracts, or numerous methods to adjust balance sheets. Hedging 
can be costly, however, if markets for relevant financial instruments are not well-
developed and liquid. Thus the issue of costs of exchange rate instability can be viewed 
as a mirror image of financial market development. Countries may choose to consider 
exchange rate stability an outright policy objective rather than implementing reforms 
contributing to financial market development.  
There is a controversial issue whether exchange rate stability also promotes price 
stability more generally. Since price level volatility generally is strongly correlated with 
the inflation rate, this issue can be viewed as the question whether fixed or flexible 
exchange rates are most consistent with low inflation. This question was discussed in the 
previous section.  
                                                 
4 Reduced transaction costs and reduced risk in international trade leads to trade creation but there ar no 
welfare reducing trade diversion effects occurring in response to discriminatory trade policy. A reduction of 
transactions costs among some countries relative to others increases trade among these countries at the 
expense of trade with other countries but this shift is not trade diversion, since the other countries are no 
longer competitive.  
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 It is ultimately an empirical issue whether a fixed exchange rate and a monetary 
union contributes to trade creation as a result of reduced transaction and information 
costs of the type discussed. The evidence on this issue is very weak. Until very recently 
the evidence indicated that trade creation effects of fixed exchange rates are negligible 
and in some studies even reversed (Glick and Wihlborg, 1997), but more recently Rose 
(2000) argues that the EMU has led to and will continue to lead to very sizeable trade 
creation. Baldwin (2006) states that the “consensus” figure for the trade expansion caused 
by the EMU is 13 percent. However, Dominguez notes that this trade expansion may not 
have been caused by the EMU since non-EMU members of the EU experienced trade 
expansion of at least the same magnitude. The period since January 1999 has also been 
characterized by a worldwide expansion of trade. Thus, the case for substantial trade 
creating effects of a monetary union remains to be made in a comparison with floating 
rates. In a comparison with a hard peg in CB arrangement, the case is even weaker. 
Ultimately, openness and trade flows thrive in environments characterized by stable 
growth wherein political pressures for protectionism are low. 
Even if exchange rate stability does not have a significant impact on trade in 
goods and services, a case can be made that financial markets tend to become more 
integrated in a currency union. The question is whether financial market integration is 
endogenous relative to monetary integration.  
  If a monetary union enhances the liquidity, depth and informativeness of 
securities markets, households could benefit from improved risk-sharing and firms from 
reduced capital costs.   
A major challenge in any analysis of EMU in this respect is to distinguish 
between consequences of EMU and of EU reforms more broadly. We turn first to specific 
securities markets with a focus on effects of reduced transactions costs. Thereafter risk-
sharing and payments system effects are discussed. 
 Bond and Equity markets. There is evidence reviewed in Mongelli and Vega 
(2006) that the costs associated with internationalization of bond and stock portfolios 
have decreased since the euro was introduced, and that investors in the EU and the EMU 
have increased the EU component of their portfolios relative to the domestic component. 
The question remains to what extent these developments depend on the euro or on 
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liberalization of securities markets within the EU through, for example, the Investment 
Services Directive. The indications so far are that the euro could be important for the 
integration of bond markets but less so for stock markets. 
Already before EMU there was substantial foreign portfolio investment in the 
equity markets in Europe. The US and the UK were the major foreign investors. These 
countries have kept or even expanded their large role in the form of investments by 
mutual and pension funds. At the same time, equity markets investments have 
expanded in continental Europe in response to EU reforms and increased attention to 
corporate governance issues. Financial markets have de facto been “Anglo-
Saxonized”. In this process mutual funds have expanded their role in the continental 
European countries. These developments are still in the early stages and they would 
most certainly continue with or without the euro. Forbes (2005) finds that stock 
market correlations within the Euro-zone have increased by 16 percent, but during 
the same period the correlation with the U.S. market increased by 25 percent. 
 The financial markets where the euro is likely to play the most important role 
are the markets for government bonds and potentially for corporate bonds.  Dermine 
(2003) argues that increased substitutability of government bonds issued in different 
countries will lead to a Europe wide market for government bonds. The absence of 
differential currency risk on bonds issued by governments in the Euro-area implies 
that Euro-area bonds differ only in terms of government default risk, which should be 
reflected in yield differentials if there is no EU-guarantee behind bonds issued by 
individual governments. Gaspar and Hartmann (2005) show that the cross sectional 
standard deviation of interbank interest rates in the money markets have declined 
drastically as a result of the removal of the exchange risk component in cross-country 
interbank lending. 
 The existence of one or several deep markets for government bonds markets can 
also help contribute to the development of efficient corporate bond markets in the euro 
area. The German government bond can serve as an efficient benchmark for pricing of 
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corporate bonds denominated in euro. Although bank debt still is the dominant source of 
financing for firms in continental Europe the euro may play a positive role in the 
development of increasingly efficient markets for corporate bonds.  
In the bond markets as in equity markets, the development of an 
infrastructure for trading and issuing securities in the EU is a prerequisite for 
integrated markets. The studies of equity market integration reviewed in Mongelli 
and Vega (2006) indicate that increased integration in the EU is part of the 
globalization process worldwide, as well as of increased importance of equity markets 
in the EU following from an increasingly Anglo-Saxon regulatory structure. 
Risk-sharing:  Studies in the US indicate that state specific shocks are smoothed to a 
substantial degree through capital markets (40% according to Asdrubali, Sørensen and 
Yosha, 1996). Similar studies in Europe by Marinheiro (2003) and Melita (2004) find 
that most of the smoothing in Europe occurs through national government budgets, and 
that interregional lending plays a relatively small role in the Eurozone. The expansion of 
stock and bond markets in Europe during the last 10 years is likely to increase the role of 
financial markets in risk-sharing in Europe. 
The effects of EU and the EMU on trade, output and income fluctuations 
influence opportunities and demand for risk-sharing in financial markets. There are two 
dimensions to risk-sharing through financial markets. First, income fluctuations create a 
demand for consumption smoothing through credit markets. Second, portfolio investors 
seek to diversify risk of individual securities and other sources of income in order to 
obtain the best possible risk-return trade-off.  
 Increased intra industry trade increases correlations of returns across countries. 
Thereby, opportunities for diversification across EMU countries decreases and the 
demand for diversification through investments outside the EMU and the EU increases.  
Income smoothing opportunities through borrowing and lending within the EMU would 
also be relatively small to the extent economic fluctuations are correlated. Thus, with an 
expansion of intra industry trade risk-sharing opportunities within the EMU decline and 
efficient risk –sharing requires integration with financial markets outside the EMU. On 
the other hand, increased specialization would reduce correlations of returns within the 
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EMU and increase the opportunities for diversification by investing in a multi-country 
EMU portfolio. The need for diversification outside the EU would be less than in the 
previous case.  Consumption smoothing can be accomplished through borrowing and 
lending within the EMU to the extent specialization implies non-correlated output 
fluctuations. 
 Turning to empirical evidence, Willett, Permpoon and Wihlborg (2006) present 
output correlations indicating that the expansion in trade has been intra industry. This 
observation is supported by Giannone and Reichlin (2006). Eiling, Gerard and de Roon 
(2005) have found that country returns in equity markets have become less volatile and 
more correlated in the euro area during the late 90s. Instead industry returns have become 
more volatile and less correlated. Thus, diversification obtained by means of cross-
country diversification in the early 90s can now be achieved through cross industry 
diversification. This cross industry diversification cannot be obtained within each euro 
member but some international diversification within the euro area is necessary. Thus, 
reductions in transaction costs for intra EMU investments contribute to risk-sharing 
opportunities. Also, substantial diversification gains with respect to country risk are 
available through investments outside the EMU and the EU. Integration of financial 
markets across, for example, the Atlantic, remain important for risk-sharing opportunities 
and increasingly important to the extent European economies become more integrated. 
Payment system effectiveness.  The role of EMU in the payments system may seem 
obvious in the sense that the member countries abandon their individual currencies 
in favor of the common currency. Thereby, costs of currency exchange can be 
reduced. The quantitative importance of these effects is questionable and indirectly 
analyzed in studies of, for example, the trade effects of EMU.  
 In spite of the common currency, cross border payments within the EMU remain 
several times more expensive than domestic payments. The reason is that banking 
systems, and clearing and payment systems remain nationally oriented, and that legal 
systems differ with respect to some securities. Gaspar and Hartmann (2005) view these 
differences as obstacles to further integration of financial markets.  
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4. Likely costs and benefits in an Asian currency union context. 
Wyplosz (2002) argued that the logical next step after a pegged rate is a hard peg within 
the context of a union of sort. He reasoned that the unholy trinity (capital mobility, 
independent monetary policy and fixed exchange rates) involves a clear tradeoff between 
policy independence and exchange rate fixity. He concluded that since all floats have 
been dirty, and since adjustable pegs have caused more dislocation than they have solved, 
that a hard peg is the answer. But the hard pegs, he argued, that the currency boards of 
Argentina, Hong Kong and Estonia were built upon did not work either. Khoury and 
Wihlborg ( KW, 2006) demonstrate that this is a weak argument since it ignores the 
degree of orthodoxy of the CB and the level of government manipulation of money 
supply in the CBs. KW further demonstrated the success and its foundation of the CB 
experiment in Estonia, and showed that continuation with a CB may very well be 
preferable for Estonia in lieu of EU membership. Asian countries need to have all of 
these options and their implications considered with careful attention to their benefits and 
costs. 
The benefit/cost categories listed in Tables 2 and 3 need to be evaluated for each 
potential currency union member to reach firm conclusions about the most suitable 
candidates for an East Asian currency union. This task is beyond the scope of this article 
but we can point so some differences between East Asian countries, the Central and 
Eastern European countries that recently joined or are joining the EU, and the Western 
European countries now participating in the EMU. We can also draw parallels between 
Asian countries and some Central and Eastern European countries. The latter are 
candidates for EMU participation and already members of the EU.  
 One major difference between the candidate countries for EMU membership and 
the East Asian countries is that the former group is joining an already functioning 
currency union with established institutions while the latter group does not have a plan 
with respect to transition to a new currency, to institutional aspects such as decision 
making procedures, and to the issue whether a new currency will be formed or all 
members will adopt one of the existing currencies like the Yen or the Rembimbi. 
Alternative versions of irrevocably fixed rates like dollarization, and very hard pegs like 
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currency board arrangements and hard pegs with cooperative intervention policies, cn be 
considered as well. 
  Another difference is that the recent members of the EU are joining a broad and 
far-reaching integration process by becoming members of the Internal Market and 
associated institutions in the EU, while Asian countries have few institutional structures 
in common. 
 The countries (or provinces) under consideration in East Asia could include 
Japan, S. Korea, China, Hong Kong, Taiwan (if politics permit), Thailand, Malaysia, 
Singapore, Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, Indonesia and the Philippines. The countries range 
from advanced industrialized to relatively poor developing countries. Their political 
systems are different and the economic structures are different. The last five countries 
have a relatively large share of raw materials in their international trade. In comparison 
with Europe, including Central and Eastern Europe, the trade of the Asian economies is 
oriented towards third countries like the USA to a much higher degree than the trade of 
European countries.  
 The first benefit/cost category in Table 2 for effects of monetary policy 
harmonization is inflation. Unlike many European countries the Asian economies have 
generally shown a high degree of monetary discipline. Thus, the benefit of importing 
credibility does not seem to have the same weight in Asia as in Europe. On the cost side 
policy preferences with respect to a monetary and fiscal policy mix could be very 
different, however. Concerns about deficit financing of individual countries has been a 
major issue in the EMU as well as in the Maastricht transition criteria. The latter includes 
a limit on the budget deficit as well as on the national debt as percent of GDP. The 
differences in political systems and fiscal policy making procedures are likely to be much 
greater in Asia than in Europe. Thus, a “stability pact” referring to limits on fiscal deficits 
could be harder to enforce in Asia than in Europe (where enforcement is not successful). 
On the other hand, the Asian countries may be less likely than the EU to implicitly 
guarantee each others’ national debts. Thereby, the interest rates on each individual 
country’s debt should be more responsive than in the European case. On the whole, 
inflation and fiscal discipline should not be a major concern in most of the Asian 
economies. 
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 Output stability--the second benefit cost category in Table 2-- could be an issue 
for countries where real shocks are more important than shocks emanating from the 
financial sector. It is well accepted that a floating exchange rate can serve as an automatic 
stabilizer for real shocks. Within the group of Asian countries, this issue could be 
important for the relatively raw material oriented and poorer economies that do not have 
a very well diversified industrial structure.  
 Adjustment and use of policy instruments in response to shocks—the third 
category in Table 2—is very much a topic of OCA and, as noticed, the issue has come up 
in the debate about the EMU after its formation. There are three main aspects to this 
issue: (i) are asymmetric shocks a frequent and large concern for the currency area?, (ii) 
is the degree of labor mobility or wage flexibility sufficient within the currency area, and 
(iii) can fiscal transfers smooth consumption when different parts of the currency area is 
impacted asymmetrically? The fiscal transfer system is likely to be almost non-existent in 
an Asian currency union. In the EMU the transfer system is small relative to the situation 
in the USA but some methods of transfer exists. If there is little labor mobility and wage 
rigidity when currency members are hit by shocks asymmetrically, exchange rate 
adjustment is an effective policy instrument and there are costs associated with a 
currency union. The performance of the Asian economies in this respect varies. Large 
parts of most of the economies are not unionized but unions seem to be strong in some 
sectors in, for example, South Korea. Thus, in comparison with Europe asymmetric 
shocks are most likely more important but wage flexibility in most of the countries is 
likely to be higher. Labor mobility between countries is bound to be very low, however. 
Thus, the cost of giving up the exchange rate as a policy instrument depends very much 
on wage flexibility in the individual countries. Events during the Asian crisis indicates 
that exchange rates can play a positive role in adjustment.  
 Among the issues contributing to costs or benefits of a monetary union there is 
finally the insurance aspect. In the discussion of the EMU we mentioned in particular that 
the country with weak, inflation prone political institutions and little central bank 
independence could benefit from a monetary union. The currency union “ties the hands” 
of policy makers with respect to inflation prone policies. We noted above that most Asian 
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countries have shown stronger monetary discipline than many European countries. Thus, 
the need for this type of  insurance is most likely less in Asia than in Europe.  
 Turning to benefits and costs as a result of payment system integration in Table 3 
we have expressed scepticism about the importance of costs of currency exchange for 
international trade. We are similarly sceptical about the degree to which a currency union 
enhances the information content of prices. The currency risk issue is likely to be an 
important argument for policy makers favoring a currency union, however.  
 It is widely believed that exchange rate risk discourages trade substantially. 
Although we expressed scepticism on this point as well for European countries, exchange 
rate risk can be a greater concern in Asia where financial markets are less developed in 
many countries and, therefore, hedging short term exchange rate risk can be costly.  
 Risk sharing in financial markets is also made more costly if financial markets are 
not well developed. The benefits of risk sharing through international diversification 
within an Asian currency union could be greater in Asia than in Europe since business 
cycles fluctuations in the Asian economies are less synchronized by trade flows. Thus, 
the benefits from capital flows among the Asian countries could be large. Recent 
proposals to develop markets for Asian bonds for both governments and corporations 
indicate that financial market development is an important policy concern. Not only 
would there be benefits in terms of risk-sharing but corporations would have access to a 
deeper and more liquid market than in individual countries. The question is then whether 
a currency union would contribute strongly to a reduction in transactions costs and risk in 
financial market transactions in Asia.  
 The evidence from Europe indicates that bond markets indeed have become more 
regional and deeper after the EMU was formed. The currency union effect cannot be 
disentangled from effects of institutional developments, however. In the EU the 
harmonization of rules, increasing competition in securities markets, increased 
transparency of corporate governance systems, cross-border operations of brokers as well 
as trading platforms have progressed rapidly. We believe that these developments by far 
outstrip the currency risk factor in importance. This conclusion is based on the ability of 
non-EMU countries within the EU to take advantage of EU wide securities markets as 
much EMU members. 
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 The evidence from the EU indicates that institutional reform of financial markets 
enabling competition and cross-border trading should be the priority if governments are 
serious about improving opportunities for risk sharing and corporations’ access to liquid 
securities markets. Developments if financial markets contribute to lowering the costs of 
hedging exchange rate risk as well. The benefits of the creation of a currency union are 
themselves likely to be relatively small. These benefits would have to be weighed against 
the potential costs of removing a macroeconomic adjustment mechanism for countries 
with relatively rigid labor markets and sensitivity to terms of trade shocks. 
 There are less rigid exchange rate arrangements than a currency union that could 
allow a more favorable trade-off between costs and benefits. For example, Estonia has 
become one of the greatest successes among the transition economies in Eastern and 
Central Europe with a Currency Board (CB) arrangement. After becoming independent as 
a result of the break-up of the Soviet Union in 1991, Estonia quickly reformed its 
economy. The central bank was assigned the role of a CB in April 1992. This reform was 
a centerpiece in a package of economic reforms establishing a very open and liberal 
economy. Europe. 
 The potential benefits and costs of an EMU membership on the macro 
level for Estonia are linked to the added credibility of an irrevocably fixed rate in periods 
when severe shocks affect Estonia and most of Western Europe asymmetrically. The 
added credibility of the EMU under extreme conditions carries a cost, since the 
credibility is linked to the complete loss of the exchange rate as an adjustment 
mechanism. Under a CB arrangement the exchange rate could be changed as an 
“adjustment of last resort”, while leaving the EMU must be considered a viable response 
only under desperate circumstances.  
The CB as a viable and nearly equivalent alternative to EMU membership 
requires that the CB has high credibility. This credibility depends also on a country’s 
ability to adjust to shocks without exchange rate adjustment. Estonia’s success has been 
explained by flexible labor markets, high capital mobility, free trade, a well functioning 
financial system and a disciplined fiscal policy.5 These factors contribute to the 
economy’s ability to adjust to shocks and to the credibility of the CB. The same factors 
                                                 
5 See Khoury and Wihlborg (2006) 
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are not required to achieve credibility as a member of the EMU, but they are required to 
avoid costs of participation in a currency area.  
 
5. Concluding remarks 
 The empirical evidence on Europe’s experiment with the EMU has led to the conclusion 
that the experiment has been rather successful so far and that it can perhaps show Asian 
countries the way towards their own version of a monetary union.  
 The road to such an experiment has been very long and costly indeed. Meanwhile 
the ideas offered to Asian countries have not been in short supplies. No one can argue 
that a monetary union is indeed possible if everyone adopts the yen or the Yuan as the 
currency for Asia with appropriate institutional arrangements. Alternatively, one could 
have a single currency like the Yuan whose convertibility in Asia is assured and have all 
other Asian currencies pegged to it. Kwan (1994) argued for a Yen-based currency 
system for East Asia.  
Eichengreen and Bayoumi (1996) developed an index for the optimum currency 
area (OCA) for Asia and found that the countries are not ready for such. Wyplosz (2002) 
enumerated the following sufficient reasons for an area to develop a union: strong 
economic integration through trade, falling barriers to capital and labor flows. Both are 
achievable as world trade now overshadows the largest of GDP’s and as the WTO works 
ever harder to bring down barriers. Yet, the state of the development of Asia’s economic 
and political systems remains a cause for concerns. There are few Asian institutions that 
could possibly be relied upon to further the idea of a union: APEC, ASEAN, CER, etc., 
but these institutions are neither fully inclusive nor well structured. The Chiang Mai 
arrangement that allows for mutual swap arrangements to defend Asian currencies is a 
hopeful sign. It is close to a restrictive version of an EMS that preceded the EMU. 
 Monetary unions like those of Europe and (arguably) the US involve much harder 
steps to take for Asia when compared to Currency Boards, dollarization and a peg. A 
currency union carries with it substantial risks for several Asian economies; in particular 
in terms of adjustment to asymmetric shocks. These risks must be weighed against 
potential benefits in the financial markets in particular. There is hope for a substantial 
improvement of institutional conditions in Asian financial markets with a potential for 
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much greater benefits than those associated with a currency union. Attention to such 
institutional development is likely to have a much higher pay-off without touching on 
political sensitivities than efforts to form a currency union. 
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Table 1. Political benefits and the costs of joining the EU from a Central-Eastern 
European perspective. 
 
 Benefits Costs Alternative 
arrangement 
Benefits and 
Costs 
Security Greater security relative 
to the Russian Bear 
 Reliance on 
NATO alone 
Sovereignty Greater influence on 
EU decisions of great 
relevance whether 
member or not 
Loss of sovereignty in 
some respects  (Less 
influence in decision 
making bodies 
affecting domestic 
rules) 
 
Institutional 
harmonization 
If EU institutions have 
greater legitimacy than 
national institutions 
If EU institutions have 
lower legitimacy than 
national institutions 
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Table 2.Monetary Policy Harmonization; Macroeconomic effects of the EMU 
 
 
 
        Benefits          Costs Alternative: 
Strong 
Currency 
Board or 
constitutionally 
independent 
Central Bank 
with inflation 
target and float 
Inflation A tool to obtain CB-
independence 
a. Reduced inflation 
b. Importing 
credibility 
(depending on domestic 
alternative) 
Less responsiveness to 
domestic policy 
preferences 
a. Short term 
policy 
b. Long term 
inflation trend 
 
Benefit and 
cost can be 
obtained if 
institutions 
obtain strong 
credibility 
Output stability Output stability 
depending on nature of 
shocks  (real or nominal 
rigidity?) 
Instability depending 
on nature of shocks 
(real or nominal 
rigidity?) 
Credible 
Currency 
Board like 
Monetary 
union. Float 
reverses 
benefits and 
costs 
Adjustment and 
policy 
instruments 
Greater domestic 
flexibility induced by 
inability to change 
exchange rate. 
(Endogenous flexibility) 
Loss of instrument for 
BoP adjustment (real 
or nominal rigidity 
without endogenous 
flexibility) 
Credible 
Currency 
Board like 
Monetary 
union. Float 
reverses 
benefits and 
costs 
Insurance Handing authority to 
ECB, If institutional 
support for a politically 
independent central bank 
is lacking,  
Implicit insurance of 
national debt 
strengthens incentives 
to run fiscal deficits 
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Table 3: Payment System Harmonization; Microeconomic consideration 
 
 
 Benefits Costs Alternative: 
Same as in Table 2 
Costs of currency 
exchange 
Trade creation: 
Reduced transaction 
costs in cross-border 
payments within 
EMU. 
Risk-sharing in 
financial markets 
 Negates potential 
benefit 
Currency risk Trade creation: 
Reduced exchange 
rate risk 
Risk.sharing 
Trade reduction: 
Potential increase in 
macro-exposure: 
a. exchange 
rate regime 
related 
b. reduced 
diver-
sification 
Currency Board like 
monetary union. 
Float reverses 
benefits and costs 
Transparency Trade creation: 
Information 
contents of prices 
Risk-sharing 
 Currency Board like 
monetary union. 
Float negates 
benefit 
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